The Africa Rising Narrative - Whither development? by McKenzie, Rex A.
1 
 
 
 
 
Economics Discussion Papers 2016-9 
 
 
THE AFRICA RISING NARRATIVE - WHITHER DEVELOPMENT? 
 
Rex A. McKenzie 
 
Kingston University 
London, UK      
 
16 June 2016 
 
Abstract 
Over the last ten years the mainstream press have put together an Africa Rising narrative 
which tells us that because of a series of “good” governance reforms and more responsible 
economic management (by technocratic and not ideological leaders), African countries have 
managed to transform their economies into growing vibrant engines of growth. Robust 
growth rates that averaged 5.8% a year between 2002 and 2012 formed the basis of 
expectations that there was more to come. In 2011 The Economist (Dec 3rd) reported that, 
after decades of slow growth ‘Africa now has the real chance to follow Asia in embarking on 
fast growth in a very short period.’ After years of repose - Africa was rising. Basing its 
predictions on data from the IMF, The Economist (ibid) declared that Ghana, Mozambique, 
Nigeria and Zambia would be among this decade’s star performers. Recent events (like 
Ghana’s 2015 IMF bailout) may have dented the narrative but it persists because although 
Africa’s 2015 GDP declined 1.2% to 3.4% from 4.6% in 2014, it is still among the fastest 
growing regions in world. There is clearly a huge disconnect between the narrative and the 
images of African migrants risking life and limb to get away from Africa and into Europe. 
This article explores the sources of the disconnect and evaluates the narrative. How and why 
did The Economist (and others in the media and the economics profession) manage to put 
forward the bold claim that the 21st Century belonged to Africa? 
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1.0 Introduction 
Over the last ten years the mainstream press have put together an Africa Rising narrative which tells us that 
because of a series of “good” governance reforms and more responsible economic management (by 
technocratic and not ideological leaders), African countries have managed to transform their economies into 
growing vibrant engines of growth. Robust growth rates that averaged 5.8% a year between 2002 and 2012 
formed the basis of expectations that there was more to come. The narrative seems remarkably out of step 
with the horrors of the Ebola crisis that the media carried between 2013 and 2015. It does not sit well and 
does not mesh with media stories on the legion of Somalis, Nigerians, Liberians, and others from Sub 
Saharan African who have been prepared to travel across the Sahara from their respective countries into war 
torn Libya and other parts of North Africa, and then to undertake a perilous journey across the 
Mediterranean and into Europe. Such a vision does not square with the Africa rising narrative. There is 
clearly a gap in the perception of the ordinary African and that of the mainstream. The empirical evidence 
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comes from two sources; an Afrobarometer survey taken in 2013, (cited in Taylor, 2016) of perceptions and 
the AfDB Index of Public Protests (AfDB et al 2015 cited in Bond, 2016), Table 1 summarises the results 
and prompts the working proposition that perceptions of socio-economic injustice are feeding protest and 
disaffection across Africa. What then is the source of the disconnect between the ordinary citizen and the 
Africa Rising proponents of the mainstream? The explanation offered here is quite simple; it arises out of 
the need to sanitise neoliberal capitalism and to present it with its best face.  
Table 1 
Perceptions Respondents 
Condition national economy -“fairly” or 
“very bad.” 
53% 
National economy has improved in the 
past year. 
31% 
Things have gotten worse 38% 
Governments doing ‘fairly’ or ‘very badly’ 
in improving the living standards of the 
poor 
56% 
Fairly or very badly in creating jobs 71% 
Fairly or very badly narrowing income 
gaps. 
76% 
Year Index of Major Public Protests 
2000 100 
2013 550 
  
Source: Afrobarometer survey of Perceptions (2013, cited in Taylor, 2016) and the AfDB Index of Public Protests (AfDB et al, 
2015 cited in Bond, 2016) 
This paper argues that despite the foundations laid by Seers (1969), Sen (1999) and others, the mainstream 
press and its economists have taken a crass view of economic development and by some mysterious means 
have managed to conflate growth in GDP with development. Other writers (Taylor 2015 and Bond 2016) 
show that such growth as has occurred has been based on an intensification of resource extraction with 
deepening dependency and increasing inequality that is far more consistent with the perceptions of the 
ordinary African. The paper is arranged as follows; section two establishes the theoretical basis of the paper. 
I follow Moyo et al, (2012), and frame the history in terms of primitive accumulation described by Marx 
(2013). I present the significant rise in prices during the commodity supercycle in the last decade as 
evidencing a new scramble for Africa. The remaining sections on BRICs, Land Grabs, Sovereign Debt, Licit 
and Illicit Flows are parts of the African political economy that militate against any idea of a rise in African 
fortunes. In other words these are countervailing tendencies that tell the story that the Africa rising narrative 
omits. These are the stories that inform the perception of the African citizen and together they inform a more 
general narrative of economic injustice and inequality. Finally the paper examines changes in the Gini 
coefficient of African countries over the last ten years and concludes by offering an explanation in terms of 
the sanitisation of capitalism for ideological and hegemonic reasons by the mainstream press and its 
economists. If it could be logically claimed and demonstrated that Africa was indeed rising it would be a 
vindication and legitimisation of the neoliberal order, an order that ultimately speaks to convergence in 
living standards between nations in a capitalist world.  
2.0 Historical Parallel – A Scramble for Africa 
Africa’s insertion into world capitalism is historically based on its ability to supply a vast army of labour for 
the plantations of mercantile capitalism and then subsequently as a producer of raw materials as inputs for 
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the factory system of industrial capitalism. That position has continued through the centuries virtually 
unchanged albeit that the labour arriving now in Europe is unwanted. As a continent with a population 
of over 1.2B people, massive commodity repositories – 1/10th of the world’s oil, 1/3rd of its mineral reserves, 
and 2/3
rd
 of the world’s diamonds – and approximately 60% of the world’s uncultivated arable land, Africa’s 
fortunes have always been closely linked with the global commodities cycle. Thus, between 2002 and 2011 
the super cycle propelled prices to historically high levels and Africa as a commodity exporter garnered 
windfall earnings from these higher prices. As a consequence growth in GDP expanded at a substantial rate.  
Figure 1: Commodity Price Index 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia, 2015, in Bond, 2016. 
 
Over 2014-15 the prices of primary commodities declined precipitously, “oil by 50 percent, iron ore by 40 
percent, coal by 20 percent and copper, gold and platinum by 10 percent” (IMF 2015 cited in Bond, 2016, 6) 
and the commodities super cycle came to an abrupt end.   
 
According to Moyo et al (2012), the high prices of the supercycle signal a 21
st
 Century thrust for African 
resources representing a new ‘scramble’ for Africa that forms historical parallel with the scramble of the late 
19
th
 Century. To the extent that this new scramble involved monopolistic firms and major states in a 
‘geopolitical’ struggle for resources it is a classic scramble. Its newness derives from four systemic 
determinants (ibid): 
 
1. A neoliberal opening up and financialisation of national economies.  
2. A series of privatisations of state and communal property that were all a part of the neo liberal project;  
3. The ongoing and ‘silent’ alienation of land that started in the 1990’s and resulted in its concentration in 
hands of domestic and foreign capital.  
4. The USA’s proxy war in the Great Lakes region that started after the collapse of its strategic pillar in 
Central Africa. 
 
These are the systemic roots fuelling the drive for African resources. According to the authors the systemic 
determinants represented the escalation of an ongoing process of the primitive accumulation that Marx 
(2013) was the first to write about. In writing on the subject Marx tried to show that, “capitalism deploys 
extra-economic force to separate peasants from the land and commodify both labour and land; and how the 
capitalist system, once created, continues to exploit labour by less transparent means, that is, by the 
appropriation of labour power beyond the labour time necessary for the social reproduction of the 
workforce” (Moyo et al, 2012: 185). Primitive accumulation in Africa has been a more extreme process than 
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elsewhere. As a result, one of the distinguishing features of the African periphery is the character of 
accumulation which has set in motion a permanent process of semi-proletarianisation (ibid). In turn this 
results in the ejection of the peasant producers from the countryside without their full absorption into any 
other sector (industrial, manufacturing or service). According to Foster et al. (2011), this ejected population 
performs an essential function in the world economy, not merely as a reserve army that drives down wages 
but as a reserve that funds the reproduction of capital by its own unremunerated labour. The self-exploitation 
of the semi-proletariat is a key dimension of super-inequality, and is itself an extra-economic contribution to 
capital, in the sense of not being accounted for by the market (Moyo et al, 2012). 
 
Primitive accumulation has always been accompanied by the use of violence.  In the recent period, the use of 
violence by Western powers has been propelled by both external and internal factors. Turning to the external 
first; at the start of 2001 a Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG) spoke to the 
instability in Western Asia and North Africa which could disrupt the USA’s energy supplies. The seismic 
felling of the twin towers on 9/11 amplified these concerns and set off a policy exchange on energy from 
which oil production in Africa emerged as an alternative source to the endangered sites in West Asia. 
According to Moyo et al, 2012, China did not standby idly. She viewed these developments with grave 
concern and fearing a possible exclusion from key sources of oil and vital shipping lanes, Beijing developed 
its own Africa strategy (Government of China, 2006, cited in Moyo et al, 2012). This is the external source 
of the re-militarisation of US strategy but the less acknowledged source of the scramble has been the 
changing security context on the continent (ibid). Here there are three key internal inter-related events that 
are important; 
1. The first was the political transition to democracy in South Africa. This transition deprived 
imperialism of a staunch ally in Southern Africa.  
2. The second was the state fracture and war in the DRC, by which the United States lost its main pillar 
in Central Africa. Indeed, the two Cold War pillars of US strategy in these regions – the apartheid 
state and the Mobutu regime – collapsed in the space of a few years.  
3. Third, Somalia and Sudan in the East, Boko Haram and Côte d’Ivoire in the West, Libya and North 
Africa. All threatened the control over critical sources of energy and/or supply routes. 
 
3.0 BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) 
This section discusses the role of BRICs in Africa. The focus is China and South Africa and their use of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on the continent. They are discussed in relation to FDI by capital outlay 
and FDI by the number of ongoing Greenfield projects (the direct investment in physical facilities by foreign 
companies).   
China’s investment in Africa has been substantial and much has been made of its spending on infrastructure. 
But China invests more heavily in Europe and North America. This is because their motives for investing 
overseas are usually centred on access to new technologies and tie-ups with prestigious brands (FT, Oct 6
th
, 
2015). When it comes to FDI in Africa it is in fact western companies that are most active in Africa.) Judged 
by capital expenditure, China ranks fourth in the list of countries for 2014. South Africa ranks eighth on the 
list of top investing countries. Insofar as it affects Africa it is the eye catching mega projects usually in the 
energy and extractive sectors that grab the headlines. But it is the smaller and more diverse projects that 
deliver most of the jobs on the ground; “Typically, the larger the number of projects the greater the level of 
diversification.” (Ajen Sita, CEO, EY Africa Attractiveness Survey, D. Parnell, Forbes.com April 12, 2016). 
Where the BRICs are using FDI in this way they are enjoined in a job creating process that supports 
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diversification away from resource dependency into the financial services, consumer, construction, retail and 
telecommunications sectors. In terms of FDI, what Africa needs and should welcome is the type of FDI that 
creates jobs and reduces resource dependency.  
 
Table 2: FDI by Capital Expenditure 
By Capital Expenditure Capex* Share of Total 
France $18b 21% 
Greece $10b 12% 
USA $8b 9% 
China $6b 7% 
Belgium  $5b 6% 
Canada $5b 6% 
UAE $5b 6% 
South Africa $5b 6% 
Germany $3b 3% 
UK $3b 3% 
Other $19b 22% 
Total $87b 100% 
Source: fDI Markets in The FT Oct 6
th
, 2016 
 
Table 3: FDI by Current Projects 
Country No of Projects % Change from 2013 
USA 97 49% 
UK 51 -54% 
France 46 21% 
S. Africa 45 -13% 
Germany 35 3% 
UAE 32 10% 
China 28 180% 
Portugal 26 160% 
Spain 22 -19% 
India 17 -60% 
Other 261 -7% 
Total 660 -6% 
Source: fDI Markets in The FT Oct 6
th
, 2016 
 
The BRICs are united by the fact that they have all benefited from the neoliberal opening up of African 
economies, but as Moyo et al, (2012:195) observe; “Their modes of engagement with Africa are no less 
diverse or contradictory.” The BRICs in Africa bring another layer of complexity to the picture in that 
they have modified and intensified exploitative practices of the Western TNCs (see Bond and Garcia 
2015). Many left leaning observers have endorsed the BRICs New Development Bank (NDB) but I join 
Bond, 2016 in emphasising the deep contradictions that would be involved and in questioning 
whether such developments represent a decisive break with the past or a reproduction of the existing 
power structure? “The Contingent Reserve Arrangement, for example, requires BRICS countries in 
financial trouble … to go to the IMF for a structural adjustment loan and policy once they have exhausted 
30 percent of their borrowing quota.” (Bond, 2016:16) In general the case against western TNCs “based 
on their excessive profiteering and distortion of African economies” has been well made. But the 
worst form of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is the type which comes “solely in search of raw 
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materials.” Today such FDI comes not just from the advanced countries of the centre, but from BRICs 
countries operating as sub imperialists on the African continent.   
 
By contributing to an increase in the competition for African natural resources, BRICs countries played a 
major part in sustaining prices during the super cycle. While globally FDI has been in retreat falling from a 
peak of $1.5 trillion in 2011, to $1.2 trillion in 2014, in Africa, FDI inflows have been stable at around $54b 
a year (UNCTAD, 2015). Although there was a 15% decline in FDI into North Africa, flows into sub-
Saharan Africa actually rose 5% to $42 billion in 2014 (ibid). In aggregate Africa’s share of the global FDI 
market is small at 4.4%, but it is growing and seems set to grow further. 
  
Business arrangements and partnerships with BRICs companies are complex and sometimes sinister. For 
instance, Swiss commodity giant Trafigura, in a partnership with Angolan company, Cochan Limited and 
the shadowy
1
 China International Fund, now control Angola’s railway infrastructure, fuel distribution 
network and iron ore deposits via a vast global network of off-shore companies registered in various tax 
havens. Using funds coming from Angola’s oil sales to China, the DT Group’s tripartite arrangement has 
fashioned a conglomerate that consists of property, fuel, steel-making, shipping and logistics holdings 
(Grobler, 2014).  
3.1 South Africa 
South Africa’s role on the continent is a matter of controversy. Bond (2004, 599) sees South Africa as a 
subimperialist power with its capital engaged in the “systematic internal exploitation” of the rest of 
Africa. According to Lesufi (2006: 33), “South African capital has all the essential features of imperialism as 
conceptualized by Lenin’. For Taylor (2011, 123), and in Alden and Le Pere (2009) such conceptions are a 
huge overstatement. What is incontrovertible is that South African corporations wield great power up and 
down continent (Martin, 2016, 163) and it is the use and exercise of this power that causes unease among its 
neighbours. According to Henning Melber, Pretoria has “... always protected its own industry and destroyed 
infant industries in other countries. At the same time SA companies ruthlessly destroyed local enterprises to 
create monopolies in the Southern African Customs Union states. I never had any illusions that SA economic 
interests were only pursuing exactly these. Yes, from a Namibian perspective SA is subimperialist and a 
junior partner to imperialism.” (Namibian political economist Henning Melber, 2013, in Bond, 2014).   
 
So what are the facts and what does the evidence tell us? Ernst & Young’s 2015 ‘Africa Attractiveness 
Survey’ estimates that South Africa’s foreign direct investment in the rest of Africa has increased by 57 
percent since 2007. In 2010, 17 out of Africa’s top 20 companies were South African2. And by 2012, South 
Africa invested in the rest of Africa more than any other country in the world’ (Bond, 2014).  In 2014, (in 
terms of Greenfield investment) South Africa was the fourth biggest country-based source of FDI in 
Africa judged by the number of projects (fDI Markets cited in Financial Times October 6th, 2015). The 
                                                          
1 The Hong Kong-based China International Fund (CIF) is also known as the 88 Queensway Group. The CIF is Beijing’s official 
representative in Angola. CIF acts as the exclusive broker for all Angola’s large infrastructure contracts. According to a United 
States congressional report CIF’s president is Sam Pa, also known as Xu Jhiang. Xu Jhiang is a former military officer who was 
trained with Angolan President Eduardo dos Santos in Soviet Russia.  There are a plethora of accusations against him around 
unsavoury business practices in minerals-for-infrastructure deals in every troubled African country from Guinea to Madagascar. 
CIF’s Angolan partner is the DT Group which is owned by generals of the Angolan army. The Asian holding arm, DTS Holdings 
(Singapore), lists General Leopoldino “Dino” de Nascimento as its sole director. De Nascimento is the former information chief 
under Angolan President Eduardo dos Santos and advisor to General Manuel Helder Veira “Kopelipa” Dias. (See, Grobler, 2014). 
2
 These include, MTN, Standard Bank, Shoprite retail, and Sanlam insurance. 
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corporate model for expansion and penetration seems to be, to use the larger markets in the South to 
achieve economies of scale and then swamp and flood other countries with cheaper products that 
destroy the residual basic needs manufacturing sector in these countries. Bond (2016: 12) points out 
“this is a form of looting also based on the IFF strategies used against South Africa by TNCs.”  About a 
dozen South African companies take part in the looting and carving up of Africa; British American 
Tobacco, SAB Miller breweries, the MTN and Vodacom cell phone networks, Naspers newspapers, four 
banks (Standard, Barclays, Nedbank and FirstRand), the Sasol oil and remnants of the Anglo American 
Corporation empire- all use FDI as a weapon and all derive substantial FDI profits from its 
deployment in Africa. 
 
In 2013 Wiki Leaks, published a 2009 Stanfor internal memo.  Stanfor is a Texas based intelligence firm. 
The memo emphasises a crucial feature of the South African political economy missed by many a radical 
scholar; ‘South Africa’s history is driven by the interplay of competition and cohabitation between domestic 
and foreign interests exploiting the country’s mineral resources. Despite being led by a democratically-
elected government, the core imperatives of South Africa remain the maintenance of a liberal regime that 
permits the free flow of labor and capital to and from the southern Africa region, as well as the maintenance 
of a superior security capability able to project into south-central Africa.’(Stanfor 2009, memo cited in 
Bond 2014). The interplay has engendered what may appear to be schizophrenic policy response from the 
South African authorities; on the one hand South Africa is a major actor steered in a regional mutual defence 
pact positioned against Western military interference in Southern Africa, and on the other hand, the country 
continues to serve as a hub for Western economic interests on the continent (Moyo et al, 2012)
3
. What 
appears to be schizophrenic behaviour is in fact a reflection of the complexity of the circumstances. The 
viewpoint adopted here is that South Africa exhibits these polar features because of the complexity of its 
history and the strength of the contending groups within South Africa. Thus it is at one and the same time 
capable of subimperialist aspirations while standing against Western geo political expansion in Africa. 
 
3.2 China 
 
Given the resource endowment commodity prices have proven to be the single most significant determinant 
of national income.  Between 2002 and 2008, prices rose extremely quickly driven largely by demand 
coming primarily from China and India.  By 2012 the African continent had expanded its rate of trading 
with the major emerging economies – especially China – from around 5 to 20 percent of all trade and by 
2009 China had overtaken the United States as Africa’s main trading partner (Bond, 2014). 
The Economist (April 20, 2011) captures the scale of the change, “A recent Chinese government survey of 
1,600 companies shows the growing use of Africa as an industrial base. Manufacturing’s share of total 
Chinese investment (22%) is catching up fast with mining (29%) The government in Beijing facilitates all 
sorts of activity in Africa. Construction is the most popular, it accounts for three-quarters of recent private 
Chinese investment in Africa. Many African countries influenced by Industrial Policy and the East Asian 
miracle have made industrial investments a precondition for resource deals. “In Ethiopia two out of three 
resident Chinese firms are manufacturers.” (Economist, April 20, 2011). The commerce ministry reports 
that Chinese companies are signing infrastructure deals worth more than $50 billion a year. Alternately the 
figure set aside for investment in African farming is $5 billion. A lot of Africans view this anxiously. The 
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 According to Bond in Pambuzuka 11
th
 April 2014, “The SA National Defense Force made a fool of itself in the Central African 
Republic just before the 2013 BRICS summit, defending ‘Jo’burg businesses’ (including some with apparent African National 
Congress links) according to troops who came home furious about what was termed (by the new government) their ‘mercenary’ 
mission.” 
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most significant Chinese push to date, has been in finance. Industrial and Commercial Bank of China has 
bought 20% of Standard Bank (a South African lender and the continent’s biggest bank by assets), and now 
offers renminbi accounts to expatriate traders. Other mainland banks have opened offices too; reportedly 
they make collateral-free loans to Chinese companies
4
. China-Africa ties have matured over the past decade, 
substantially altering the make-up of Africa's political and economic milieu. In 2011, South Africa exported 
goods worth R90.2-billion to China, R42.7-billion to Germany, R29-billion to the UK, R12.9-billion to Italy 
and R6.3-billion to France. 
The racialised global culture woven by imperialism is a grossly under researched component of European 
expansion since the slave trade. According to Moyo et al (2013: 3) this culture, “has yielded an enduring 
‘hierarchy’ of peoples, including a special paternalism towards the African continent.” (Ibid)  This 
viewpoint is reflected in President Museveni of Uganda words; "The western ruling groups are conceited, 
full of themselves, ignorant of our conditions, and they make other people's business their business, while 
the Chinese just deal with you who represent your country, and for them they represent their own interests 
and you just do business."  (FT, March 3, 2013) This history of race and racism is helping to cement 
Africa/China relationship but because it derives from a global capitalist history Africa’s new non-western 
BRICs partners are as susceptible to its influence as Europeans or Americans. (see Moyo et al, 2013) In 
terms of trade seventy percent of Chinese exports to Africa are made up machinery and manufactured goods. 
In return eighty five percent of its imports from Africa are in the form of oil and raw materials.   
During the supercycle China was driven by what seemed to be an insatiable demand for commodities. It 
offered cheap infrastructure loans in exchange in particular for access to oil and between 2000 and 2011 
bilateral trade rose from around $11bn to $160bn. The 2012 figures show that trade between China and 
Africa reached $160-billion in 2011, up 28% from the previous year and in 2013, China accounted for 18% 
of Africa's trade, compared with 10% in 2008. China is marginally more expensive, but despite this it has 
managed to grow exports to Africa rapidly. This is no doubt that this is a concerted effort on the part of the 
Chinese. The financial press is replete with stories of high-level political visits and success seems to have 
bred more success to the extent that “Chinese and African businesses are now more comfortable transacting 
with one another. State-owned companies encouraged to "go out" have been successful in Africa, enabling 
China to increase its exports of equipment, machinery and vehicles.” (Helmo Preuss, 
www.Timeslive.co.za). African imports from China expanded by 23.7% in 2011 to $73-billion and in 2012 
Africa sourced 16.8% of its imports from China – up from only 4.5% in 2002.  
 
Given Africa's demand for infrastructure and China's differential approach to financing, markets for 
African/Chinese exports and imports have been opened up.  These seem set to grow. There are challenges, 
foremost amongst them the possibility the weaker demand for African commodity exports and African food-
price increases coming from a local currency depreciation. Thus as far as Africa is concerned the most 
important change in the post crisis period is the emergence of China as the clearest counter-force to the 
West. In addition African governments now lean towards China as an economic partner over Western 
countries for at least three important reasons (Quartey, 2013). 
1. China's own development experience has instructive value.  
2. China fulfils Africa's need for critical infrastructure more cheaply, less bureaucratically,  
                                                          
4
 Theoretically, Africans are eligible to borrow on the same terms, but in effect this rarely happens. 
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3. China portrays Africa more positively as a partner in "mutually beneficial cooperation" and "common 
prosperity," rather than a "doomed continent" requiring aid. 
These three combine to reinforce and deepen Africa/China engagement thus in that a new South-South axis 
has been established the world has changed in a profound and historic manner. 
4.0 Land Grabs 
 
China and India have been prominent in land grab stories and so has South Africa. In this way the BRICs 
add another layer of complexity to the analysis of imperialism on the African continent. Land grabbing 
entails the large-scale acquisition of land in developing countries, by domestic and transnational companies, 
governments, and individuals
5
. The surge in land grabs caught the attention of the media and policy and 
academic circles only in 2008 on the back of the surge in food commodity prices (Moyo 2010). Ghosh 
(2008), and Tabb (2008), show that the diversion of food production to agro-fuels and the oil-related price 
increases accounted for 85 percent of the food price increases. However, the ‘food crisis’ is not the first 
determinant of the scramble for land in Africa. In Moyo (2010) land grabs have a long and uninterrupted 
history that date back to the last scramble. 
 
According to Oxfam (2011), as much as 227 million hectares of land – an area the size of Western Europe – 
has been sold or leased since 2001, mostly to international investors. “The bulk of these land acquisitions 
took place between 2009 and 2011, according (Land Matrix Partnership in Oxfam, 2011). There are two 
very big features of the process that are important in identifying key changes that followed the Great 
Recession of 2007-2008 (Cotula et al, 2009). First, dominance of the private sector with strong financial and 
other support from government, and significant levels of government-owned investments; second, 
dominance of foreign investment with domestic investors also playing a major role in land acquisitions. In 
2007-2008 the world food price crisis that accompanied the Great Recession was immediately for Africa far 
more decisive than the shocks that were to emanate from financial crisis. Food security fears at the centre 
prompted investors and speculators to seek out vast tracts of agricultural land in Africa for the purposes of 
food and biofuels production. So as the credit markets dried up and financial activity ground to a near halt, 
Hedge Funds, Sovereign Funds, and the Pension Funds and other finance led western companies carved out 
another area in Africa where super exploitation of resources would yield super profits
6
. This time they once 
again connected financial speculation to the question of the land and rentier capital migrated from troubled 
financial markets in the centre.   
 
5.0 Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs) 
 
According to (Kar and Spanjers, 2015, cited in Bond 2016: 23), Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole lost 6.1 
percent of GDP annually to IFFs. According to Global Financial Integrity (GFI), 2015, (ibid), between 2004 
and 2013, IFFs cost South Africa $21 billion per year and $18 billion per year in Nigeria. Africa has a level 
of illicit capital flows is staggeringly high (Kumar, 2014). According to Bond (2016), the charge that 
Africa is ‘Resource Cursed’ fits the data well. The African Development Bank (2013) African Economic 
Outlook estimates $319 billion in illicit outflows between 2001-10, with the most coming from, 
                                                          
5 Initially hailed by investors and some developing countries as a new pathway towards agricultural development, investment in 
land has come under increasing fire from a number of civil society, governmental, and multinational actors for the various 
negative impacts that it has had on local communities. (StopAfricaLandGrab.com). 
6
 Those involved include Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, London-based Emergent that works to attract speculators, Spellman 
College and various universities including Harvard and Vanderbilt. (The Guardian, June 8, 2011) 
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“Metals, $84bn; Oil, $79bn; Natural gas, $34bn; Minerals, $33bn; Petroleum and coal products, $20bn; 
Crops, $17bn; Food products, $17bn; Machinery, $17bn; Clothing, $14bn; and Iron & steel, $13bn.” (Bond, 
2016)  
 
Illicit flows cost the continent in two main ways,  first, Ndikumana and Boyce 2012, (in Kumar, 2014: 28) 
estimate that if all the flight capital between  2000-2008 had been invested in Africa – assuming  the same 
productivity as actual investment – the average rate of poverty reduction would have been 4 to 6 percentage 
points higher per year. Second, in that illicit flows make efforts to tax wealth largely ineffective and 
therefore contribute directly to worsening income inequality (ibid). The African Development Bank and 
Global Financial Integrity reported on illicit flows in a 2013 study and found that illicit financial flows were 
the main motor behind a net drain of resources from Africa of US$1.2-1.3 trillion (on an inflation-adjusted 
basis) during that period. Nigeria, Egypt, Zimbabwe, Zambia and South Africa lead the continent in terms of 
outflows. Ranking illicit financial outflows from all countries around the world as a percentage of GDP, 
Nigeria (8th), Zambia (9th), Zimbabwe (13th), Malawi (14th) and Sierra Leone (15th) are all represented in 
the top 20 in the world. 
Illicit flows come from three main sources, bribery and corruption (3% of the global total), the criminal 
component, made up of money laundering related to drug and human trafficking, counterfeiting and illegal 
arms trading (30-35% of the global total)  and  commercial tax evasion. By far, the major source of illicit 
flows accounting for 60 to 65 % of the global total is commercial tax evasion (GFI cited in Kumar, 2014). In 
mispricing transactions companies manipulate the price of exports and imports so as to artificially depress 
profits and evade tax. The transnational nature of the corporations that trade between subsidiaries in 
different countries means a company can appear to lose money – or to make very little profit – in the country 
it is operating in, while making money in other jurisdictions where the tax laws are not as exacting or in the 
case of the tax havens where no real production and sales activity takes place, and crucially no tax is 
applied
7
.  
The foremost practitioners of trade mispricing (or transfer mispricing) are highly integrated companies 
involved in the extractive sector  that make extensive use of offshore centres and tax havens. Evidence from 
Ghana, Sierra Leone and Zambia support the case. According to one study (Pritchard, 2009 cited in Kumar, 
2014) on Ghana, “There is a widespread awareness of the fact that mining firms are engaged in aggressive 
tax avoidance and evasion, largely through trade mispricing and claiming excessive capital allowances’. 
The Ghanaian Minister of Finance in his 2012 budget statement estimates that Ghana loses US$36m a year 
due to trade mispricing in the mining industry. In Sierra Leone, as of 2011, only one of the major mining 
firms was paying corporate income tax and this was because their agreement included a turnover tax of 
0.5%. None of the top five were reporting profits despite the rapid growth of mineral exports ... Detailed 
audits of mining companies have never taken place in Sierra Leone and there is growing concern about the 
scale of revenue losses.” (ibid: 32) 
As the release of the Panama Papers show the line between what is licit and illicit is a blurred one. The 
purpose of off shore, tax haven (with the help of reputable lawyers like Mossack Fonseca) is to make what is 
illicit, licit. There is no way to accurately estimate the size of this business but there is no doubt that 
important people all around the world and our foremost transnational companies with legions of accountants 
and lawyers are all involved in avoiding taxation. 
                                                          
7 Christian Aid the UK charity has estimated that between 2005 and 2007 Nigeria lost US$956m in tax revenue due to commercial tax dodging 
and that trade mispricing costs developing countries US$160bn in lost revenues every year(see Kumar, 2014). 
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6.0 Sovereign Debt 
In 2006, Seychelles became the first sub-Saharan African country outside South Africa to issue a global 
sovereign bond in 30 years. The size of the issue was a mere $200m. In October 2007, Ghana became the 
second when it issued a $750 million Eurobond with an 8.5% coupon rate.  Between 2008 and 2013 the 
deals got larger and included nine other countries – Gabon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Senegal, Angola, Nigeria, Namibia, Zambia, and Tanzania. By February 2013, these ten had 
collectively raised $8.1 billion from their maiden sovereign-bond issues, with an average maturity of 11.2 
years and an average coupon rate of 6.2%. These countries’ existing foreign debt, by contrast, carried an 
average interest rate of 1.6% with an average maturity of 28.7 years (Stiglitz and Rashid, 2013). In 2013 a 
dozen countries in the region managed to raise more than $5bn; “2013 was a record year for sub-Saharan 
Africa ... the fact that more and more issuers came into the market created self-momentum and additional 
comfort both to investors and to new sovereigns debuting in the market” (Florian von Hartig in the FT, Dec 
15, 2013). Taking North Africa – Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt – and South Africa into consideration, the 
continent raised almost $10bn in global sovereign bonds in 2013, up from about $1bn a decade ago. 
Moody’s (quoted in Blas, 2013) expect that for 2014-2015, six more African countries - Angola, Cameroon, 
Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Mozambique - will debut in the international capital markets with hard 
currency bonds.  Even Ethiopia is seeking a sovereign rating as the first step towards its own bond issue.  
Sovereign issues have the advantage that they escape the conditionality and close monitoring typically 
associated with the multilateral institutions making them more attractive to issuers that would otherwise 
have to borrow through the multilaterals.  There is no doubt that Africa has benefited over the past six years 
– and particularly since 2010 – from investors’ hunger for yield because of the ultra-loose quantitative 
easing (QE) monetary policies in the US, Japan and Europe (See in the  FT, Dec 15, 2013).  QE has driven 
interest rates to historic lows, and this in turn has driven investors’ search for yield. From the African side 
the woeful inadequacy of official assistance and concessional lending with which the continent can meet its 
infrastructure needs serves as an impetus towards sovereign issue. In combination these factors have led to 
the significant increase in sovereign debt issue from the African continent. On the downside the freedom is 
gained at a price because sovereign bonds carry significantly higher borrowing costs than concessional debt. 
The increased reliance on foreign investors – and the voracity shown by non-resident investors for Africa 
has prompted the International Monetary Fund  and the World Bank to warn to issue similar warnings that 
emphasise sub-Saharan Africa’s vulnerability to global shocks. In these circumstances any increase in 
interest rates would constitute a clear and present danger for the continent. Clearly interest rates are going to 
(and indeed have already started) to rise as the Fed prepares the ground to reduce its stimulus to the US 
economy. The questions that need to be resolved are; what will be the order of magnitude of the increase? 
And how quickly and how orderly will be the transition? For now we can only say for sure that;  “The 
JPMorgan Nexgem Africa index, which tracks the bond market in the region, is yielding 6.79 per cent, up 
from a low-point in January of 5.3 per cent but down from a “taper tantrum” peak of 7.9 per cent in June” 
(ibid). 
Who holds what is not clear. OECD data shows that foreign holdings of government debt are significant 
only in South Africa. Yet statistical data based on international investment position (IIP), suggests that in 
2011 foreigners held Seychelles and South African debt equivalent to about 10% of those countries’ 
respective GDP. The share was around 5% for Ghana, Mauritius, Swaziland and Tunisia. Long-term debt 
represented the largest share. Moreover, monthly inflows into mutual funds dedicated to African bonds 
suggest global investors are increasingly attracted by the asset class (Vajs, 2014). 
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As Stiglitz and Rashid (2013) argue, to the extent that the new lending is based on Africa’s strengthening 
economic fundamentals, the recent spate of sovereign-bond issues is a welcome sign. Yet the record so far 
raises eyebrows; how exactly was Zambia able to lock in a rate that was lower than the yield on a Spanish 
bond issue, even though Spain’s credit rating was at the time four grades higher? And what exactly are the 
contingencies in the event of a decline in the price of copper from which Zambia makes most of its earning? 
Further in January 2011, Côte d’Ivoire became the first country to default on its sovereign debt since 
Jamaica in January 2010. In June 2012, Gabon delayed the coupon payment on its $1 billion bond, pending 
the outcome of a legal dispute, and was on the verge of a default. If oil and copper prices were to fall 
precipitously, Angola, Gabon, Congo, and Zambia would all have difficulty servicing the debt. Taken 
together and with the knowledge that sovereign debt markets like all others are subject to the same short 
termism that contributed so powerfully to the crisis in the first place.  Yet, bankers, investors and African 
officials are untroubled. In mitigation they contend that the region’s financing needs are relatively small 
when compared with others and that although issuance has expanded enormously, the size of the 
international sovereign bond market in Africa remains small.  Further, Moody’s, the rating agency, estimates 
the total stock of government and corporate debt in hard currency across the continent at less than 4 per cent 
of the size of the regional economy, well below the 11.3 per cent of Latin America and the 5.1 per cent of 
Asia. As the market grows they see that growth as an opportunity to spread and diversify risk across 
countries.  
7.0 Inequality 
Measured by the Gini Index, Africa is home to some of the most uniquely unequal nation states in the world. 
Out of thirty three African countries for whom the World Bank keeps such data, twenty have  Gini’s over 
forty, eight have Gini’s over fifty and three (South Africa, Namibia and Seychelles) have Gini Indices that 
are over sixty (Figure 2).  
 
The regional Gini for Southern Africa in general is only comparable to the inequality found in certain parts 
of Latin America (Palma, 2011). The unifying and underlying theme of the essay is therefore inequality and 
the countries under review are separated into three groupings determined by their Gini’s (see Table 4).   
Table 4: African Countries by Gini Index 
Gini 30-40   Egypt, Mali, Burundi, Ethiopia, Niger, Sudan, 
Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Liberia, Cameroon, 
Togo, Burkina Faso, 
Gini 40-50  Senegal, Mauritania, CIV, Angola, Ghana, 
Malawi, Madagascar, Uganda, DRC, 
Mozambique, Kenya, Nigeria, 
Gini 50 +  Rwanda, Swaziland, Zambia, CAR, Namibia, 
South Africa, Seychelles 
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Along with the Africa Rising narrative there has been an increasing recognition of a young populous 
continent with a growing middle class. Cognizant of the fact that Africa’s population has reached the one 
billion mark and that this figure represents 15% of the world’s population and is set to rise to 20% by 2030, 
many western companies have started to turn to Africa. At the time of writing, these pronouncements appear 
to be premature because according to the Africa Progress Panel (2012), only 4% of Africans have an income 
in excess of $10 a day. According to Kumar (2014), Africa has been subject to a millionaire’s boom. South 
Africa has 48,800 US dollar millionaires and Nigeria has 15,900. “In terms of cities Johannesburg tops the 
continent’s rich list with 23,400 dollar millionaires. Lagos is in third place with 9,800 and Nairobi in fifth 
place with 5,000. Accra in Ghana is expected to be the fastest-growing major city for African 
millionaires.”(ibid: 13) What is stark in post crisis Africa is the polarity between rich and poor the huge gap 
between the rich and the poor. There has been a millionaires’ boom everywhere on the planet, but what is 
different in Africa is that 48.5% of sub-Saharan Africa’s population earn less than $1.25 a day and hunger 
affects 240 million people. Thus, an island of wealth is surrounded by a sea of poverty.  Inequality and 
poverty are, as we know, the twin legacies of history. But what appears novel and important in the post crisis 
period is the appearance of a growing divide between rich and poor.   
Gabriel Palma’s 2011, “Homogeneous Middles vs. Heterogeneous Tails, and the End of the ‘Inverted-U’ 
focuses on the share of income of the richest 10% and the poorest 40%. He argues that quintiles are not the 
best analytical category in measuring inequality. By splitting the sample into deciles changes at the top and 
bottom ends are brought into sharper focus. In other words, while the Gini Index that we started with 
concentrates in the share of income of the middle income groups, the Palma Ratio focuses on the income 
shares of the very rich and the very poor at the tails of the distribution. What he finds is that by far the most 
important determinant of the income share of the rich is what happens with the income share of the poor
8
. 
Cobham and Sumner (2013) find that countries which reduce their Palmas have rates of progress three times 
higher in reducing extreme poverty and hunger compared to countries with rising Palma inequalities.  
 
Kumar (2014) applies the Palma ratio to selected African countries. She finds that for South Africa in 2009 
the ratio stood at 7. In other words the top 10% of the population earns seven times as much as the bottom 
40%. In South Africa – starting from a very high base – there has been a 24% increase in the concentration 
of income over a 16-year period. For Nigeria, the change in the Palma ratio between 1986 and 2010 records 
a 75% increase in the concentration of income. In the more recent period (between 2000 and 2010) the 
increase was 22%. In Ghana there has been a 50% increase in the concentration of income in the country 
over an 18-year period, and a 29% increase since 1992. 
 
 
                                                          
8
 The Gini measure is more sensitive to changes in the share of income of middle-income groups. Palma demonstrates that the 
Gini is best for measuring changes in the area of the distribution that is least susceptible to change.  
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In Zambia and South Africa (countries with uniquely high levels of inequality) we have a mixed picture. 
After an unbroken rise in the Gini that extended from 1995 to 2006 South Africa has been was able to 
induce a decline in the Gini from 67.4 in 2006 to 65 in 2010. Since then the Gini has been constant. Zambia 
though is an obvious cause for concern. In Zambia the Gini climbed from 42.08 to 57.49.  This is an 
alarming increase in a short period. 
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Malawi, Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya are our countries with Gini’s between 40 and 50. In all cases there have 
been observable rises in the Gini Index. In Kenya’s case, income inequality has been increasing since 1994. 
Recent data, from the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics and the Society for International Development, 
shows a reduction from 47.7% in 2005 to 44.5% in 2013. A 2008 World Bank study found that increases in 
consumption over the period 1997-2005/06 were concentrated amongst the wealthiest quintiles. The most 
striking finding is that the poorest quintile lost out in absolute terms, consuming less in 2005/06 than in 
1997. The gap in Kenya has grown not only because the rich have been getting richer, but also because the 
poor have been getting poorer. The Gini Indices for Ghana and Nigeria record increasing inequality. For 
both these countries, there is evidence that this rising income inequality is having a drag effect on poverty 
reduction.  
 
Only Sierra Leone shows a downward trend but this is limited to only two data entries over a limited time 
period. 
 
8.0 Conclusion 
 
In what sense can Africa be said to be rising? The GDP growth statistics are impressive but as all first year 
development studies students know - growth is not development. The spectre of land grabs, rising sovereign 
debt, a mountain of illicit flows and the new acquisitive BRICs actors on the continent are all processes that 
feed the inequality and injustice that informs the consciousness of the citizen. In doing so, they make the 
Africa Rising narrative a far-fetched flight of fancy. It is as if after years of presenting Africa as a dark 
doomed continent, we are suddenly confronted by a mainstream telling a nice story about the continent. The 
fast growth of the last decade was spurred in large degree by the commodities supercycle. It seems obvious 
that when those pressures abated that growth would inevitably slow. It follows too that after the 
unconventional monetary policy of the post crisis world a return to conventional policy would see capital 
return to the more traditional centres in the North. These are developments that are all in motion, inevitably 
so. Yet the narrative persists, according to EY’s 2015 Attractiveness Survey, “We remain confident that, 
despite economic headwinds, the ‘Africa rising’ narrative remains intact and sustainable.” My conclusion is 
that there are clearly two conversations taking place. The narrative is not aimed at the African citizen rather 
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it is directed at the mainstream and an international business sector in search of high profits and returns. The 
business community sees a young, populous continent of would be consumers. The African citizen sees 
joblessness and pervasive injustice. These two realities are irreconcilable. A concern with land grabs, 
sovereign debt, the drain of licit and illicit funds and the inequality that persists are all not of import for the 
mainstream. The need to promote the narrative in the face of evidence to the contrary arises out of the 
mainstream’s need to sanitise capitalism, to present it with its best face. If it could be logically claimed and 
demonstrated that Africa (a continent in which capitalism has never worked for the ordinary mass of people) 
was indeed rising it would be a vindication and legitimisation of the neoliberal order, an order that 
ultimately speaks to convergence in living standards between nations in a capitalist world. Africa is 
growing, and it is growing quickly-the growth statistics are not made up. But as it grows, inequality deepens 
and the land grabs, illicit activities of the Trans Nationals added to the looting of a section of the African 
comprador bourgeoisie produce a mal development that makes for an outward migration of dispirited 
citizens. So in a very real way, it makes no sense to speak of Africa Rising, at least not just yet. The 
circumstances here are reminiscent of the India Shining narrative promoted by the Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP) between 2005 and 2007. For Stiglitz that particular narrative was misleading; “It is shining on 250 
million people, but it’s not shining on 850 million more. What’s striking is how close the failures are to the 
successes. You don’t have to travel very far—an hour, half an hour—to go back 2,000 years. It is that 
contrast that represents the challenge for India going forward” (Stiglitz cited in Colombia Business School, 
2007: 2). The situation is much the same in Africa. 
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